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his paper addresses the prospect that nuclear weapons could be used 
in the Middle East – breaking the so-called “taboo” against the use of 
these weapons since the United States dropped a nuclear bomb on 
Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 and which remained unbroken throughout the 
Cold War and continues to endure. It argues that unstable dynamics of the 
coercive bargaining framework surrounding Iran’s nuclear program may be 
pushing the world closer toward the use of nuclear weapons than is 
generally realized – perhaps closer than any time since the Cuban missile 
crisis1 – and proposes a number of near- and longer-term scenarios to 
illustrate the ways in which structural uncertainties in the regional interstate 
bargaining framework could result in the use of nuclear weapons. 
In itself, the “taboo” against nuclear use is unlikely to prevent 
regional states and/or non-state actors from using these weapons to protect 
themselves and to secure their vital interests. While the very use of the 
word “taboo” in connection with nuclear weapons offers an attractive 
metaphor, it has little use as a meaningful term to describe the policies and 
attitudes of states’ and non-state actors toward the use of nuclear 
weapons. It is difficult to argue that any country has ever obtained nuclear 
weapons with the idea that the weapons would not be used.2 A case in 
                                                 
1 A compelling case can also be made that the world came close to seeing the use 
of nuclear weapons during the India-Pakistan standoff over Kashmir, a crisis that 
lasted from December 2001 through October 2002. See Polly Nayak and Michael 
Krepon, “U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s ‘Twin Peaks’ Crisis”, Report 57, 
The Stimson Center, Washington DC, September 2006, 
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/USCrisisManagementFull.pdf.  
There also remains considerable debate about our proximity to nuclear war during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. As Robert S. McNamara recalled in his 2005 Foreign 
Policy article, “Apocalypse Soon”, “The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that the 
United States and the Soviet Union—and indeed the rest of the world—came 
within a hair’s breadth of nuclear disaster in October 1962. Indeed, according to 
former Soviet military leaders, at the height of the crisis, Soviet forces in Cuba 
possessed 162 nuclear warheads, including at least 90 tactical warheads. At about 
the same time, Cuban President Fidel Castro asked the Soviet ambassador to 
Cuba to send a cable to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev stating that Castro 
urged him to counter a U.S. attack with a nuclear response. Clearly, there was a 
high risk that in the face of a U.S. attack, which many in the U.S. government were 
prepared to recommend to President Kennedy, the Soviet forces in Cuba would 
have decided to use their nuclear weapons rather than lose them.” Cf. Robert S. 
McNamara, “Apocalypse Soon”, Foreign Policy (May/June 2005), pp. 3-
4,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2829&page=0 
2 No non-state actor is reported to possess a nuclear weapon at this point – though 
the logic of the statement would apply equally to non-state actors as well. 
T 
 
J. Russell / Strategic Stability Reconsidered 
 - 10 -
point is the United States, for example, which, while embracing the concept 
of nuclear deterrence, has made a point of not foreswearing the first use of 
nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly articulated a range of plausible 
conditions under which the weapons would be used.3 The paper agrees 
with political scientist Michael Mandelbaum, who declared more than a 
decade ago that: “…like all taboos, this one will be violated under 
necessity. Individuals will eat forbidden foods, even one another, if the 
alternative is starvation; nations will acquire and use forbidden weapons if 
they deem it necessary for survival.”4 
The paper first draws upon Thomas Schelling’s ideas to assess the 
regional strategic framework, and finds systemic uncertainties which 
suggest that escalation by various parties – state and non-state actors – is 
a possible outcome. Both near-term and long-term scenarios are 
considered. The near-term nuclear use scenarios are all predicated on the 
assumption that nuclear use will occur within the context of escalation to or 
within war. As dangerous as these circumstances are, longer-term 
scenarios for nuclear use will also be proposed, which, like the alarming 
near-term scenarios, flow from the same unstable regional dynamics.  
The Middle East’s unstable dynamics occur within a global 
environment characterized by a general sense of insecurity about various 
nuclear issues. Reflecting this situation, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 
recently moved its “Doomsday Clock” from seven- to five minutes to 
midnight – the most advanced setting since 1981.5 Citing Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions, North Korea’s test of a nuclear weapon, the failure to secure 
nuclear materials, a controversial U.S. nuclear doctrine that some argue 
suggests an expanded role for nuclear weapons, and the continued 
presence of 26,000 nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia, the 
Bulletin expressed new concerns about global strategic stability. These 
developments occurred against a backdrop of the collapse of the 2005 
Nonproliferation Treaty Review conference due, among other things, to 




                                                 
3 I am indebted to Professor Daniel Moran for insights on this issue.  
4 Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons of the Next Nuclear War”, Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 1995, p. 25; There is a rich literature on the nuclear taboo. For good 
recent examples, see Nina Tannenwald “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the 
Nuclear Taboo”, International Security, vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 5-49; 
George H. Quester, “If the Nuclear Taboo Gets Broken”, Naval War College 
Review, vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 71-92; T. V. Paul, “Nuclear Taboo and 
War Initiation in Regional Conflict”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 39, No. 4, 
1995, pp. 696-717. 
5 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2007, pp. 66-71. 
6 Analysis of the failed 2005 review conference is covered in John Simpson and 
Jenny Nielson, “The 2005 NPT Review Conference”, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 
12, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 37-41.  
 
 
The Framework: From Theory to 
Regional Dynamics  
his paper draws upon Thomas Schelling’s work to highlight potential 
problems in the region’s bargaining framework surrounding Iran’s 
nuclear program, suggesting that strategic stability could be harder to 
establish and maintain in the Near- and Middle-East than it proved to be 
between the Cold War’s two superpowers. 7 
Schelling on Coercion and Escalation: A Primer  
Schelling argued that nuclear weapons could have a role in strategies of 
compellance and deterrence, i.e. forcing actors to take certain actions 
(compellance) and/or convincing actors to take no action (deterrence). In 
his view, nuclear weapons could play a role in limiting the scope of armed 
conflict once begun, since the escalation dominance it afforded could 
convince an adversary of the futility of continuing the conflict. The 
possession of nuclear weapons could, he argued, serve as an instrument to 
bring the action to a close on favorable terms to the nuclear-armed actor in 
the framework. He took this point to an extreme in Arms and Influence, 
arguing that destruction of enemy cities could form part of a coercive 
strategy to inflict successive and unacceptable levels of pain on an 
adversary in order to terminate a conflict on favorable terms.8 His book The 
Strategy of Conflict proposed “a theory of interdependent decision”9 to 
further explore the functioning of interstate coercive bargaining that is 
relevant to the current environment in the Middle East.10 
Schelling’s theoretical work on bargaining applied not only to 
escalatory dynamics such as those seen in international conflict, but also to 
de-escalatory dynamics such as those harnessed by arms control efforts. 
During this period, as recalled by Jeffrey A. Larsen, arms control experts 
“were in agreement that the objectives of arms control were threefold: […] 
reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the political and economic costs of 
                                                 
7 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, 
and T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Boston, Harvard University Press, 1960. 
Schelling’s analytical framework on interstate bargaining forms the basis for 
analysis of U.S. nuclear strategy in James A. Russell, “Nuclear Strategy and the 
Modern Middle East”, Middle East Policy, vol. 11, No. 3, Fall 2004, pp. 64-78.  
8 Schelling, Arms and Influence, op. cit., Chapter 5, pp. 190-220. 
9 For further analysis, see Vincent P. Crawford, “Thomas Schelling and the 
Analysis of Strategic Behavior”, in Richard J. Zeckhauser (ed.), Strategy and 
Choice, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, pp. 265-294. 
10 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Chapter 2, Chapter 4, op. cit. 
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preparing for war, and minimizing the scope and violence of war if it 
occurred.”11 The pursuit of these objectives through the controlled 
bargaining framework of arms control mirrored the pursuit of similar goals 
through more coercive bargaining frameworks such as strategic deterrence, 
compellance, and actual war. 
Schelling identified a number of critical elements for the predictable 
interactions between actors in a bargaining framework: actor rationality, 
common interests and mutual dependence, and a communications system 
to convey intent.12 He foresaw the potential for breakdown in the bargaining 
framework when asymmetries in communications prevented actors from 
receiving and/or conveying intent.13 This paper seeks neither to validate nor 
test Schelling’s hypotheses, which would be impossible since the presented 
scenarios are hypothetical. However, his theories on bargaining and conflict 
escalation usefully highlight problems in the region’s coercive dynamics 
that could lead to war, which, in turn, could result in the use of nuclear 
weapons.14  
Two critical underlying parts of any coercive bargaining framework 
are the motivations of the actors involved and the degree to which the 
actors will carefully weigh costs and benefits in deciding on courses of 
action. The issue of actor rationality and the function of interstate 
communications have always troubled analysts in thinking through the 
implications of assigning roles to nuclear weapons in deterrent and 
coercive strategies. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara cogently 
expressed these doubts in June 1962 during his University of Michigan 
Commencement address when he stated: “…the mere fact that no nation 
could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that 
a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations sometimes act in 
ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when acting in a 
“rational” way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, will act on the 
basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge 
the way others will react, and the way others will interpret what they are 
doing.”15 McNamara’s misgivings about the supposed rationality of actors 
involved in deterrent relationships and the problematic nature of interstate 
                                                 
11 Jeffrey A. Larsen, “An Introduction to Arms Control”, in Jeffrey A. Larsen (ed.) 
Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment, London, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 2. Larsen is citing Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. 
Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, Washington, Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985 
[orig. publ. 1961], p. 3. 
12 T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, op. cit., p.4; Chapter 3, “Bargaining, 
Communications and Limited War”, pp. 53-80. 
13 Ibid., pp. 146-150. 
14 As also argued in Russell, “Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East”, 
op. cit. 
15 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, “The No Cities Doctrine”, University of 
Michigan Commencement, June 1962. In this speech, McNamara also argued that 
“…basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much 
the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in 
the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war 
stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the 
enemy’s forces, not his civilian population.” 
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communications are reflected in much of the literature on deterrence theory 
and remain relevant in the context of today’s Middle East.16 
Regional Coercive Framework 
The strategic environment in the Middle East consists of various troubling 
and interactive factors that could combine in dangerous ways that lead to 
the use of nuclear weapons. The Iran nuclear program and the region’s 
changing nuclear status constitute one element in a complicated region-
wide coercive bargaining framework that involves adversarial regional 
states, non-state actors, and various outside global powers. Not all the 
actors in the framework share common assumptions to bound the 
bargaining framework; some of the actors have opposing interests and 
objectives at stake; and, there is no common agreement between the 
antagonists and even the protagonists on acceptable outcomes in the 
bargaining process. 
In the Middle East today, none of the elements identified by 
Schelling for a stable interaction and a successful bargaining outcome can 
be found, suggesting that strategic stability remains an unlikely outcome, 
though less controlled and balanced bargaining activity can nonetheless 
occur. Because of the underlying asymmetries of this strategic 
environment, the current volatility of the strategic competition, and the 
diminished prospects for stability, the risk of escalation past the nuclear 
threshold remains elevated. The region boasts one nuclear weapons state 
(Israel) that confronts another non-nuclear state (Iran) that most observers 
agree seeks to obtain nuclear weapons. The outcome of Iran’s quest for the 
bomb is being closely watched by other regional states, some of whom may 
change their nuclear status if Iran successfully crosses the nuclear 
threshold.17 Israel has repeatedly stated its intent to stop Iran from crossing 
the nuclear threshold, while Iran has just as vehemently stated its 
commitment to develop an indigenous nuclear capability – although it 
denies intent to build a nuclear weapon. Rounding out the framework’s 
state actors are nuclear-armed outside powers that have vital interests at 
stake in the outcome of the standoff. The most important of these is the 
United States, which has an estimated arsenal of 4,075 operational nuclear 
warheads.18 The United States has repeatedly stated its intent to defend its 
                                                 
16 For example, in his book Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills, Sage 
Publications, 1977, p. 78, Patrick Morgan notes that the circumstance of threat and 
reaction can create psychological reactions in the minds of the actors that can 
introduce “…some influence from irrational objectives and perceptions into an 
otherwise rational decision-making process.”  
17 As argued in Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, 
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 
110th Congress, February 2008. Also see Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. 
Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors”, Survival, vol.49, No. 2, 
pp. 111-128. Regional reactions to Iran’s program are also addressed in James 
A. Russell, “A Tipping Point Realized? Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and 
Middle East”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 29, No. 3, December 2008, 
pp. 522-538. 
18 Estimated by the Nuclear Information Project and the Federation of American 
Scientists, http://www.nukestrat.com/nukestatus.pdf 
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nuclear-armed regional ally (Israel), creating a strategic environment in 
which the use of nuclear weapons by the United States is implied as part of 
its commitment to Israel’s security. Leaders of such outside powers as 
France and the United Kingdom, both medium-sized nuclear powers, have 
at various times also expressed opposition to Iran’s program and have 
warned Iran not to cross the nuclear threshold.19 Though these France and 
the United Kingdom are both nuclear powers and are involved in the 
region’s politics, their commitment to Israel’s security must be regarded as 
less comprehensive than the United States: it is very difficult to imagine a 
scenario under which either France or the United Kingdom would consider 
using their nuclear weapons to disarm Iran by force.  
The coercive bargaining framework thus must be seen as an 
integrated whole in which global, regional, and inter-state dynamics are 
inextricably intertwined. Each of these levels involves its own dynamics of 
competition, conflict, and cooperation that affect the broader framework. To 
understand how complex is the regional framework, one first needs to 
review the various actors’ security posture and interests. 
As the nuclear armed, pre-eminent global power, the United States 
has a variety interests and objectives at stake that guide its behavior in the 
bargaining framework. Its principal strategic interest is to preserve regional 
stability and ensure that international energy markets can continue to “fuel” 
the global economy. It also secondarily fears an existential threat from an 
Iranian nuclear weapon, though the overwhelming U.S. nuclear arsenal 
places it in a position of permanent superiority that could conceivably be 
used as the basis for deterrence. The U.S. protection of Israel – a powerful 
domestic political issue – must also be near the top of any list of objectives 
in the framework. The United States extends its nuclear umbrella over 
Israel. It has funded Israel’s missile defense system as one of a variety of 
steps to help its closest regional ally build a seamless web of deterrent, 
defensive and offensive capabilities. U.S. interests do not stop there, 
however. The United States also has security commitments with many 
additional regional states (Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States) and has 
developed a significant host-nation basing infrastructure to support the 
forward deployment of its military personnel that form part of these 
commitments. By implication, a nuclear umbrella is implicitly draped over all 
regional states that allow use of their military facilities by U.S. forces. 
Bilateral defense cooperation agreements in place throughout the region 
(except Saudi Arabia) not only commit both parties to jointly respond to 
threats to their security, but the United States has historically held out the 
right to respond to threats against its military forces with all means at its 
disposal, particularly in the case of attacks by chemical or biological 
weapons.20 The United States has also historically extended a nuclear 
umbrella over Europe as part of its defense commitments to that region – 
                                                 
19 Charles Bremner, “Sarkozy Talks of Bombing if Iran Gets Nuclear Arms”, Times 
Online, August, vol. 28, 2007, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2337190.ece.  
20 As discussed in James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “Negative Assurances 
and the Nuclear Posture Review”, Strategic Insights, vol. 1, No. 5, July 2002, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/july02/nukes2.asp.  
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some states that would technically be within reach of Iran’s long-range 
missiles. These extended deterrence commitments introduce an added 
layer of complexity in shaping U.S. interests, motivations, and actions in the 
bargaining framework.  
While there is close overlap in many areas, Israel’s vital interests 
and objectives differ from the United States in important respects. Since it 
is not a global power with global commitments, Israel’s vital interests are 
more narrowly defined. Above all, Israel seeks to prevent existential threats 
to the state and seeks to preserve its regional monopoly on nuclear 
weapons as the principal means to achieve this vital interest. While the 
United States and Israel share a common objective of curtailing Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions, there is an asymmetry in interests that stems from 
simple geography and military realities. Israel faces a hostile state 
rhetorically committed to its destruction less than 1,500 miles from its 
borders. A nuclear-armed Iran with long-range missiles capable of 
delivering a nuclear payload with minutes of warning time is unacceptable 
to Israel. The United States is less directly threatened by a nuclear-armed 
Iran, though political realities of the U.S.-Israeli relationship may make this 
asymmetry moot. It would be a mistake, however, to ignore the impact that 
these different interests could have on supporting particular bargaining 
framework outcomes. Perhaps more importantly, these different interests 
suggest that the parties could react quite differently in a wartime escalation 
scenario with Iran. History supports this argument. The asymmetry of Israeli 
and U.S. interests formed a powerful backdrop during Gulf War I, when the 
United States successfully convinced Israel against responding to 
Saddam’s missile attacks in Gulf War I.21  
European states – two of which are nuclear armed – express less 
implacable opposition than either Israel or the United States to a deal that 
allows Iran to develop an indigenous nuclear capability. While they share 
concerns about the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon, the Europeans 
show themselves more willing to allow Iran to build a nuclear power 
infrastructure under strict international oversight. As a bloc, they are 
prepared to dangle economic incentives in an attempt to convince Iran to 
change its behavior and place its nuclear program under IAEA 
supervision.22 While the Europeans have called for restraint and have taken 
the lead in attempting to find a diplomatic solution, it is unlikely they would 
become directly involved in wartime confrontation involving Israel, the 
United States and Iran. Europe could be expected to support the United 
States – even if tacitly – if and when hostilities began.  
Iran’s interests are complicated and open to interpretation. At the 
heart of arguments surrounding discussions of its long-term interests and 
objectives is the degree to which Iran is a revisionist or status quo regional 
                                                 
21 Differences trenchantly addressed by Geoffrey Aronson, “Hidden Agenda: US-
Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question”, The Middle East Journal, vol. 46, 
No. 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 617-630. 
22 On the western strategy regarding Iran nuclear program, see Mark Fitzpatrick, 
“The Iranian Nuclear Crisis. Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes”, Adelphi Papers, 
No. 398, Chap. 2. 
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power, and whether its strategic objectives are defined in realist, 
ideological, or religious terms. A more pragmatic, realist-oriented Iran, for 
example, would likely behave more predictably than a state motivated 
primarily by religion and ideology. An ideologically motivated actor might be 
less interested in negotiation and might not be deterred by the threat of 
war. In fact, it could conceivably welcome a war. Leadership rhetoric 
strongly suggests revisionist objectives of reordering the regional 
environment in ways that reflect Iranian Islamist ideological and religious 
interests. Some argue that Iran sees the possession of a nuclear weapon 
as the basis on which to create a coercive political framework that will allow 
it to push the Islamic revolution throughout the region or, under the mantle 
of Islamic ideology, more traditional Persian interests. Others, however, see 
Iran as an insecure, status-quo, realist oriented state whose pursuit of the 
bomb makes perfect sense given its strategic circumstance.23 Iran’s recent 
history suggests a troubling example of the confusing stances that 
bargaining framework participants can take towards war as an outcome. 
While Iran did not start the war with Iraq in 1980, it certainly took a series of 
steps that many governments less adventurous than Saddam’s would have 
regarded as worthy of a military response. Once the war started, Ayatollah 
Khomeini used circumstances provided by the war as a powerful tool to 
consolidate the Islamic revolution. Khomeini then resisted Saddam’s peace 
entreaties and wasn’t brought to the bargaining table until the Iran Air shoot 
down and Saddam’s dumping tons of chemical agents on his troops in the 
Fao Peninsula.24 An added disturbing element of complexity in the coercive 
bargaining framework is Iran’s established track record of employing 
subterranean means (assassination, agitation, sponsorship of quasi-state 
or non-state terrorist organizations) as instruments of its policy – a track 
record that dates to the earliest days of the post-revolutionary period and 
extends to the present. Iran’s motivations, history, and its embrace of 
terrorist groups and tactics all present a troubling and unpredictable series 
of factors that undermine the stability of the coercive bargaining framework.  
The Gulf States fear the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran because 
they believe Iran will seek to use the shadow cast by its nuclear capabilities 
in order to coerce them to behave in ways that are advantageous to Iran.25 
The Gulf State ruling elites seek to maintain the status quo, preserve their 
hold on domestic political power, want to preserve the U.S. security 
umbrella, and focus upon making money in international energy markets to 
fund national economic development. Despite their internal squabbles, the 
Gulf State Sunni political elites share a commitment to global economic 
integration and internal economic development to move their societies into 
                                                 
23 These competing arguments are summarized in Judith S. Yaphe and Charles 
D. Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of Nuclear Armed Iran”, McNair Paper, 
vol. 69, August 2005, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair69/mcnairpdf.pdf. Also 
see Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations”, 
Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 99-114. A good 
representative piece articulating a “realist” perspective on Iranian motivations is 
Ray Takeyh, “Iran Builds the Bomb”, Survival, vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 2004-2005, 
pp. 51-64. 
24 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, London, Routledge, 
1991. 
25 As noted in the Senate Report, Chain Reaction, op. cit. 
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the modern era. As a group, while they fear the prospect of a regional war 
with Iran, they would reluctantly and perhaps only indirectly support military 
action against Iran if all other attempts to reach a solution to the impasse 
fail. Despite their fear of nuclear armed Iran, these states also fear the 
consequences of any military action by either Israel and/or the United 
States. Their populations would be at risk if Iran used chemical weapons or 
biological agents to attack U.S. military installations as they would be at risk 
for nuclear fallout should either the U.S. or Israel use nuclear weapons in 
the context of conflict escalation – not to mention the probable negative 
reactions of their own population or parts thereof.26 
An acute source of uncertainty in the coercive bargaining framework 
stems from the undeniable presence of various non-state (Hamas, 
Hezbollah, and various Shiite groups) and quasi state actors (the Iran 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC). Whether these groups realize it or 
not, they constitute additional participants in the broader coercive 
bargaining framework. This is a particular problem in the Iran-Israel 
standoff, in which Iran actively supports two non-state actors (Hezbollah 
and Hamas) that are in open warfare with Israel and which have publicly 
committed to the destruction of the Jewish state. Hezbollah in particular is 
seen as a proxy of Iran, although their interests are not necessarily 
identical. After being created in the early 1980s to act as an agent of the 
IRGC in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah today is a political actor in Lebanese 
national politics. It services Shia constituencies throughout southern 
Lebanon while maintaining its historic relationships with the IRGC. While 
Hamas receives money and arms from Hezbollah via the IRGC, its long-
term objective is unrelated to Iran’s wider ambitions or even those of 
Hezbollah. It seeks above all the establishment of a unified Sunni Islamist 
Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank and the destruction of Israel. 
Iran also supports a variety of Shiite militias inside Iraq that have a similarly 
confusing series of objectives. Each of these actors are seen by the 
antagonists (Israel and the United States) as instruments of Iran, but it is 
manifestly unclear whether Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Jaysh al Mahdi 
recognize the important role they play in the broader regional inter-state 
standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, it is unclear the degree to 
which these organizations are directly controlled by Tehran and whether 
their motivations for action are in fact synonymous with Iran’s. This raises 
the prospect that aggressive actions by these groups that may be seen as 
Iranian provocation may in fact be wholly the result of decisions by local 
leadership. The involvement of non-state actors represents an acute source 
of instability in the coercive bargaining framework. 
The divergent interests and objectives of the actors introduce a 
source of unpredictability in the coercive bargaining framework, increasing 
the chances that miscalculation could lead to an escalation spiral that might 
prove difficult to control. The divergent interests and objectives of regional 
and global actors are summarized in Table 1 below. 
                                                 
26 See Ian Black, “Arabs fear fallout of nuclear conflict: Nervous Arab states fear a 
war in the Gulf but a nuclear-armed Iran is an even greater concern”, The 
Guardian, July 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/10/middleeast.iran. 
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Table 1: 
Interests of Regional Bargaining Framework Participants 
 
COUNTRY MAINTAIN STATUS QUO IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES 
IRAN 
Mixed.27 Enhance regional 
position relative to Gulf States 
and Arab Sunni political 
establishment/counteract US 
influence/Mitigate military 
threats to regime; continually 









revolution (See note 27) 
ISRAEL Yes No 
Maintain nuclear 
monopoly/no existential 
threat to state/ military 













Mixed; preserve strong position 
in Lebanon; preserve Iran ties; 
keep rhetoric of conflict at 
forefront. 
Yes 
Control of south 
Lebanon/Take over 
Lebanon/Cement position 
as vanguard of resistance to 
West-Israel; destruction of 
Israel 
HAMAS 
Mixed. Preserve position in 
Gaza– increase political 
influence in West Bank; money 





State; destruction of Israel 





Yes; preserve regional political 
and economic influence 
relative to Iran and Iraq 
No 
Regime survival; keep US 
umbrella; prevent Iran from 
establishing regional political 
and military ascendance; 
ensure market functions; 
keep getting richer; ensure 
economic development to 
keep citizens happy. 
EUROPEAN 
STATES Yes 




Regional stability/stop crisis 
escalation/buy off Iranians. 
                                                 
27 There is profound disagreement on whether Iran is a “status quo” vs. a 
“revisionist” regional power. Compelling cases can be made for both arguments. 
This is an extremely important point for evaluating Iranian motivations and actions 
in the coercive bargaining framework and in determining whether a stable deterrent 




he basis of the argument that escalation is possible in the short-term 
scenarios outlined below is that the region is today in a strategically 
unstable situation due to asymmetric interests, complex relationships 
between states and non-state actors, and a nascent Iranian nuclear power. 
In such a specific regional framework, the conditions for strategic stability 
identified during the Cold War may prove inadequate to prevent the 
outbreak of wars, and even nuclear escalation. 
Escalation and Strategic Stability 
The paper argues that a conventional preventive attack by Israel or 
America might inspire Iran to break the historic “taboo” on nuclear use or 
act in some sufficiently outrageous way that the Israelis or the Americans 
feel compelled to use nuclear weapons in response. The motives for such a 
response would be a combination of revenge plus dissuasion from 
whatever the outrageous behavior was, and it also implies that neither the 
United States nor Israel possessed conventional options that would be 
sufficiently punitive. Accordingly, strategic stability may not be attainable in 
the region. 
To fully understand this point, it is necessary to analyze the concept 
of “strategic stability”, starting with its history.28 The term has its roots in the 
history of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the second half of the 20th century. 
Indeed, strategic analysts today look upon the hallowed era of the Cold 
War with a sense of perverse comfort. Despite the fact that the world’s two 
major powers – indeed the entire world – lived under the continuous threat 
of nuclear incineration, they eventually developed a complicated but 
strategically stable relationship. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
November 1962, a system of inter-state interactions developed based upon 
one overriding shared assumption: that escalation to all-out nuclear war 
should be avoided at all costs. 
The system of strategic stability developed by the United States and 
the Soviet Union included a number of critical elements: (1) an acceptance 
in the idea of mutually assured destruction that made the prospect of 
                                                 
28 See John D. Steinbruner, “National Security and the Concept of Strategic 
Stability”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 22, No. 3, September 1978, 
pp. 411-428; For Cold War history, see Paul Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in 
an Era of Détente”, Foreign Affairs, January 1976. For a more recent treatment, 
see Walter B. Slocombe, “Strategic Stability in a Restructured World”, Survival, 
vol. 32, No. 4, July/August 1990, pp. 299-312. 
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nuclear war unthinkable and an implicit acceptance in the idea of strategic 
parity – despite the presence of a different mix of strategic forces (ICBMs, 
bombers, SLBMs, etc.); (2) agreement to create a process to control the 
numbers of overtly offensive nuclear weapons in each other’s arsenal and 
thereby prevent an unconstrained arms race; (3) development of redundant 
second strike capabilities on both sides that made it impossible for either 
side to realistically consider a first strike that would leave the adversary 
unable to respond to the attack; (4) a system of communications that could 
be activated during confrontations and crises to prevent escalation in 
conflict and an associated confidence built over time in both actors in their 
respective command and control procedures over each sides’ strategic 
forces; (5) confidence building measures that helped create a more 
cooperative political atmosphere; (6) acceptance that competition, conflict 
and rivalry could all co-exist in the interstate relationship. These and other 
assumptions formed the basis of the Cold War bargaining framework that 
helped create “strategic stability” between the world’s superpowers, even if 
Soviet and American war plans diverged from their declared doctrines, 
leaning more toward achieving military victory than relying on Mutual 
Assured Destruction as a sufficient basis for deterrence.29 
While there are limitations in drawing upon the U.S. – Soviet 
experience as the basis to judge whether the Middle East is strategically 
stable,30 assumptions from the era provide a useful starting point to judge 
whether the concept of strategic stability can be usefully applied to the 
region. Few if any of the elements that characterized the U.S. – Soviet 
strategic balance are present in today’s Middle East. For example, it is 
unclear whether the main antagonists share important and foundational 
assumptions to bound the bargaining framework surrounding their rivalry. 
Israel appears strongly committed to preventing the emergence of a 
strategic environment in which any regional state possesses comparable 
nuclear capabilities. In short, it prefers not to rely on mutual vulnerability 
and deterrence as the basis to preserve its security and remains implacably 
opposed to an environment in which there is any existential threat to the 
survival of the Jewish state, though it has tolerated some level of mutual 
deterrence ensured by Syria’s probable WMD capability via chemical or 
bio-chem tipped missiles. Its strategic assertion is in marked contrast to the 
Cold War superpower relationship, in which both sides appeared to 
doctrinally, politically, and diplomatically accept that the threat of mutual 
incineration represented an all-powerful constraint on the potential use of 
nuclear weapons. For its part, Iran claims to reject the idea that it must 
accept Israeli nuclear superiority – achieved outside the confines of the 
NPT – in perpetuity. This basic disagreement suggests that the two parties 
look at the strategic relationship from completely different and incompatible 
perspectives. Lacking the same sort of shared assumptions and 
                                                 
29 This argument may be found in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics, New York, W. W. Norton, 2001. 
30 As argued by Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a 
Proliferated Middle East: Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War”, The Nonproliferation 
Review, vol. 7, No. 3, Fall-Winter 2000, p. 44. Steinberg also forcefully argues this 
point in “Deterrence Instability: Hizballah’s Fuse to Iran’s Bomb”, Jerusalem 
Viewpoints, No. 529, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, April 1, 2005, 
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp529.htm. 
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symmetrical interests that characterized the U.S.-Soviet relationship makes 
it much more difficult to operationalize a bargaining framework to guard 
against the prospect of pre-emptive attack and conflict escalation.  
Deterrence, Escalation, and the Coercive Framework  
Asserting that the Middle East’s strategic environment is fundamentally 
unstable rests in part on a judgment that critical assumptions about 
deterrence are not commonly shared by the framework participants. 
Deterrence is essential to construction of a strategically stable framework. 
The Department of Defense defines the term as: “The prevention from 
action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought 
about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”31 
Deterrence remains stable so long as each side assesses that the benefits 
of inaction are deemed to outweigh the costs of military action. The 
opposite is also true. Deterrence fails when any of the actors judge that the 
benefits of military action outweigh the costs of inaction. Perceived actor 
credibility is critical to the maintenance of a stable deterrent relationship. 
Each actor in the framework must believe in the other’s capabilities and 
their political resolve to maintain the deterrent status quo. Deterrence also 
is unquestionably a theory that considers the motivation of actors that must 
continually assess their windows of vulnerability as part of the ongoing 
calculus that underlies a stable deterrent relationship. Other supporting 
elements in deterrent relationships are judgments assessing actor 
rationality and the communications framework through which antagonists 
convey and receive actor intent.32  
Actors in a deterrent framework typically find themselves in two 
forms of deterrent relationships: deterrence by punishment, which 
sometimes takes the shape of a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD), and deterrence by denial. Mutual Assured Destruction means just 
that – a situation in which each actor accepts that an attack by either 
adversary will result in their mutual destruction. So long as a disarming first-
strike is impossible, the military balance remains stable, and neither side 
will attack. Deterrence by denial means that actors are in a parallel or 
reciprocal manner seeking to deny the antagonist military victory under 
nearly any circumstances. It seems clear that Israel, for example, has 
adopted elements of a deterrence by denial strategy. Israel’s steps in this 
direction mirror the U.S. nuclear stance, which is today increasingly 
structured around a strategy of deterrence by denial.33 With U.S. 
                                                 
31 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, August 26, 
2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01661.html. Also see Patrick 
Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills, Sage Press, 1985, 
p. 30; Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 
pp. 1-2. 
32 As emphasized in Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of a Stable Deterrent in a 
Proliferated Middle East”, op. cit., p. 44; and James A. Russell, “Nuclear Strategy 
and the Modern Middle East”, op. cit. 
33 James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “United States Nuclear Strategy in the 21st 
Century”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 25, No. 1, April 2004, pp. 91-108; 
Richard Sokolsky, “Demystifying the Nuclear Posture Review”, Survival, vol. 44, 
No. 3, 2002, pp. 133-148. 
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assistance, Israel has reportedly taken steps to add a second strike 
capacity through the deployment of nuclear armed missiles on three 
Dolphin-class submarines.34 It also has added missile defenses through the 
deployment of several U.S.-funded Arrow anti-missile batteries and is 
continually upgrading these defenses. In October 2008, Israel installed two 
U.S.-provided AN/TPY-2 radars near the Dimona nuclear plant that 
improves its missile tracking capability as well as its ability to provide 
targeting to its ground-based anti-missile system.35 
Neither Iran nor Israel has articulated extensive views on the role 
that deterrence plays in their respective national security strategies. Israel 
initiated its nuclear program following the 1948 war of independence in 
order to deter future existential threats to the state and address Israel’s 
systemic asymmetries in relationship to its adversaries: its lack of strategic 
depth, its vulnerability to its more numerous adversaries, etc. After 
becoming a nuclear power in the late 1960s, Israel has stated that it would 
not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region and has relied on 
a combined policy of nuclear opacity and ambiguity since then. 36 Under this 
approach, Israel declines to openly declare itself as a nuclear power but in 
parallel signals through leaks and other pronouncements the existence of 
its nuclear arsenal. Such subtlety, however, may have fallen by the 
wayside, since recent statements by senior U.S. and Israeli officials openly 
acknowledge Israel’s nuclear status.37 It is difficult to argue at this point that 
Israel remains in any kind of nuclear closet.  
But if Israel’s nuclear policies on deterrence and strategic nuclear 
doctrine remain somewhat unclear, there is no confusion about its counter-
proliferation policy. Israel’s successful destruction of Iraq’s nuclear reactor 
at Osirak in June 1981 and the destruction of Syria’s reactor at al-Kibar in 
September 2007 leave little room for misinterpretation. In enunciating what 
has since become known as the “Begin Doctrine,” then-Prime Minister 
Begin told the world following the Osiraq attack that: “We shall not allow 
                                                 
34 Doug Frantz, “Israel’s Arsenal is Point of Contention”, Los Angeles Times, 
October 12, 2003, A1, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/12/world/fg-iznukes12. 
35 “Israel to Install Radar Antennae Near Nuclear Site”, AFP, October 3, 2008. 
36 Background in Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1998, pp. 1-7. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of a Stable 
Deterrence”, op. cit., pp. 48-49; Zeev Maoz, “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s 
Nuclear Policy”, International Security, vol. 28, No. 2, Fall 2003, pp. 44-77; Louis 
Rene Beres, “Israel’s Strategic Nuclear Doctrine: Ambiguity Versus Openness”, 
June 1, 2001, http://www.tzemach.org/fyi/docs/beres/june01-01.htm. 
37 In a confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
December 2006, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates openly referred to Israel as a 
nuclear power. See “Incoming U.S. Defense Secretary Tells Senate Panel Israel 
has Nuclear Weapons”, Associated Press, December 9, 2006. Several days later, 
then Israeli Prime Minister also acknowledged Israel’s possession of nuclear 
weapons when he stated that. “We never threatened any nation with annihilation. 
Iran openly, explicitly and publicly threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Can you 
say that this is the same level, when they are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as 
France, America, Russia and Israel?” As quoted in Phillipe Naughton and news 
agencies, “Olmert’s Nuclear slip-up Sparks Outrage in Israel”, Timesonline, 
December 12, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article752059.ece. 
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any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction turned against us.”38 
Many believe that the Begin Doctrine and its commitment to prevent any 
existential, holocaust-like threat to the Jewish homeland remains a guiding 
principle for Israeli security strategy.39  
Iranian views of deterrence and nuclear weapons are more difficult 
to discern. Its pursuit of a nuclear capability goes back to the days of the 
Shah. At one time the program was dropped at the initial stages of the 
Islamic revolution but then restarted during the Iran-Iraq war. While there is 
much informed speculation about Iran’s motivations for wanting the bomb 
(prestige, legitimate aspirations to possess advanced nuclear know-how, 
with dual-use implications, national identify and self esteem, regional 
influence, etc.), there is little indication from the regime on the role nuclear 
weapons would play in its national security strategy. Attempting to decipher 
Iran’s thinking on deterrence and nuclear strategy leads us in contradictory 
directions. On the one hand, the bluster from the regime suggests that Iran 
is clearly interested in maintaining deterrence in the current environment in 
order to forestall a pre-emptive attack. Its threats of retaliation and wider 
regional war are intended to convince Israel and the United States that the 
costs of preventative attack would be high – perhaps even catastrophic in 
the case of Israel. It is threatening escalation and treating the use of its 
unconventional weapons ambiguously for its adversaries – leaving 
uncertainty about whether it would actually use these weapons as part of 
conflict escalation. These threats are not the act of an irrational actor – far 
from it. Iran’s interest in deterrence and forestalling preventative strikes 
shows a recognition that it would enter a war from a position of 
conventional military weakness, and it must understand that a response on 
its part through terrorist attacks by proxies and the use of unconventional 
weapons could lead either or both its adversaries to contemplate further 
escalation to maintain their escalation dominance. Iran would face 
annihilation if the conflict entered an escalation spiral. But if it can reinforce 
deterrence over the short term by convincing its adversaries of the 
credibility of its threats through rhetoric and saber rattling, it can perhaps 
forestall the preventative attacks and achieve its goal of realizing its own 
strategic deterrent. It is a dangerous strategy given the fundamental 
asymmetrical interests between itself, Israel, and the United States. 
If Iran’s adversaries became convinced that a nuclear weapon was 
intended for solely defensive purposes, this understanding might form the 
basis for a stable deterrent relationship based on the logic of Mutual 
Assured Destruction. However, the rhetoric out of the Iranian leadership 
strongly suggests their intent to use the strategic nuclear capability once 
operationalized for offensive purposes, as a means to destroy Israel. This 
rhetoric is at variance with any appreciation for stable deterrence – a 
conclusion that has no doubt been reached in Tel Aviv. Iran’s competing 
                                                 
38 Quoted in various sources. See Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, “Israel’s 
Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime”, Arms 
Control Today, July/August 2008; http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/SpectorCohen 
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and contradictory views on possessing nuclear weapons only reinforce 
doubts over its rationality and motivations in the coercive bargaining 
framework – both critical components in deterrent relationships.40 This was 
not the case in Israel’s interactions with Saddam during Gulf War I, where, 
despite Saddam’s hostile rhetoric, he declined to escalate the conflict 
through the use of chemical weapons in his missile attacks against Israel. 
Some argue that deterrence worked in Gulf War I and that Saddam 
behaved rationally and was successfully deterred by Israel’s (and U.S.) 
nuclear weapons.41 Interestingly, Saddam used chemical weapons against 
both his external and internal opponents when they were unable to retaliate 
in kind, but didn’t cross the threshold when he faced nuclear-armed 
opponents who made veiled threats of nuclear retaliation in case of an Iraqi 
WMD attack, as during the Persian Gulf War. It is not clear whether the 
Iranian leadership would come to the same conclusion and refrain from 
implementing a provocative and de-stabilizing nuclear posture once it takes 
stock of its strategic environment, much like Saddam did, or if unique 
values and theocratic polity would continue to guide it down a different 
nuclear path.42  
Some believe that the Iranian leadership cannot be counted upon to 
systematically weigh costs and benefits in a deliberative process before 
taking military action. In other words, they would not be rational actors, at 
least as perceived through a secular lens. Israeli strategic analyst Gerald 
Steinberg cogently summarized these concerns, arguing that: “…the 
isolation of Iran’s leaders, the fog that surrounds its decision-making 
structures, the absence of direct channels of communication, and its 
radical, religious-based revisionist objectives will make the development of 
stable deterrence extremely difficult.”43 Others believe that Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad’s combative rhetoric is driven by messianic 
religious fervor.44 In his September 2008 speech before the United Nations 
                                                 
40 Some of the rhetoric out of the religious leadership seems to contradict 
Ahmadinejad. In June 2008, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stated that Iran 
remained opposed to nuclear weapons “…based on religious and Islamic beliefs as 
well as based on logic and wisdom.” He further stated that “nuclear weapons have 
no benefit but high costs to manufacture and keep them. Nuclear weapons do not 
bring power to a nation because they are not applicable. Nuclear weapons cannot 
be used.” Paul Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, November 20, 2008. Kerr draws the quote from a 
briefing from Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman on November 10, 2008. 
41 As argued by Gerald Steinberg, “Parameters of a Stable Deterrent in a 
Proliferated Middle East”, op. cit. 
42 On James Baker’s threats conveyed to Tarik Aziz, see Michael R. Gordon and 
General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War, Boston, Little, Brown & Co, 1995; 
p. 197. For a comparative cultural analysis of Iran and Iraq’s strategic personalities 
regarding nuclear threats, see Caroline F. Ziemke, Strategic Personality and the 
Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence: Deterring Iraq and Iran, Institute for Defense 
Analyses, September 2001, P-3658. For a more recent analysis focused on Iran, 
see Mehdi Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics. On the Rationality of Iranian Politics, 
Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, Policy Focus #79, January 2008. 
43 Gerald Steinberg, “Deterrence Instability: Hisballah’s Fuse to Iran’s Bomb”, 
op. cit., p. 6. 
44 Scott Peterson, “What Drives Ahmadinejad’s Combative Rhetoric”, Christian 
Science Monitor, September 23, 2008.  
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General Assembly, Ahmadinejad repeated his oft-stated call for the return 
of the Shiite Messiah to vanquish Iran’s oppressors and restore perfection 
to the world. Shiite religious tradition holds that the missing 12th Imam (who 
allegedly disappeared in 874 AD) will return as the savior of all Shiites. To 
be sure, Ahmadinejad does not exercise ultimate political or religious 
authority but Iran’s political leadership – the Council of Guardians – is 
comprised solely of religious figures. A religiously-motivated actor or series 
of actors might adopt a decidedly different thought process in weighing 
courses of action in a coercive bargaining framework in ways that weaken 
deterrence and introduce an added element of uncertainty in actor 
interactions. 
Using Steinberg’s logic, it is not difficult to construct an argument 
that a stable deterrent relationship with Iran’s leaders would be less likely to 
emerge, and, further, that the same systemic factors would produce an 
unstable actor decision-making process in a military crisis. American 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates voiced these concerns during his 
confirmation hearings in December 2006 when he stated that he could 
provide no assurance that Iran would not use nuclear weapons against 
Israel. Gates also openly acknowledged the prospect of conflict of Iranian 
use of chemical or biological weapons in the context of conflict escalation in 
the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack.45 
Communications, Actor Intent and the Rhetoric of War 
During the Cold War, the nuclear arms limitation talks between the United 
States and the Soviet Union provided useful venues for both parties to 
communicate with each other on a wide variety of issues. These venues 
complemented a formal diplomatic relationship that was never broken – 
despite fundamental disagreements on many issues. By contrast, there is 
no regional political and military framework in place to facilitate interstate 
communications to promote transparency and confidence among the 
antagonists.46 Iran has no formal diplomatic relations with its two major 
antagonists; though, ironically, it historically had good relations with both 
countries. Communications between the antagonists thus are 
operationalized through speeches and other pronouncements intended for 
a variety of different audiences. For example, Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad’s incendiary comments that stir support in his domestic 
political base have an entirely different and very negative impact in Israel 
and the wider international community. Similarly, periodic comments by 
U.S. political leaders threatening to attack Iran made before America’s 
Israeli lobby on the one hand address certain domestic political 
                                                 
45 “U.S. Can’t Assure Israel that Iran Won’t Attack”, Wire Service Reports, posted 
on Haaretz.com, December 5, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/797134.html; 
another version is posted at Ynet News at 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3336531,00.html.  
46 The U.S. may be reconsidering its lack of diplomatic presence in Tehran – which 
might help facilitate inter-state communications. See Warren P. Stroebel, “U.S. 
Plans to Envoys to Tehran For the First Time Since 1980”, McClatchey News 
Service, October 23, 2008. The story reports on the possible establishment of a 
U.S. Interests Section in Iran. 
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requirements in the United States but they also harden political attitudes in 
Iran. 
Absent a structured communications framework, the parties 
increasingly rely on a complex “signaling” process that in this particular 
case involves threatening military exercises and countermoves. In June 
2008, Israeli warplanes mounted military exercises in the Mediterranean 
that simulated a likely attack on Iran’s nuclear sites. Iran immediately 
responded with various “test” missile launches intended to demonstrate its 
capacity to hit targets in Israel. Signaling intent to antagonists via 
threatening military exercises by both parties creates conditions under 
which either or both parties may launch pre-emptive attacks if it believes an 
attack by the other is imminent. It also creates the prospect of creating 
insecurity in one or both of the adversaries if the military capacities being 
demonstrated are deemed to be of such significance that one of the parties 
believes it must attack to forestall the use of the demonstrated capability. 
Today’s interstate communication’s framework is alive with the 
rhetoric of war. Iran, the United States and Israel have all made statements 
to inflict grave damage on each other – damage that could reasonably be 
assumed to include nuclear weapons. Stated differently, the antagonists 
are openly threatening each other and signaling a direct intention to attack 
the other. Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad 
repeatedly state their desire to destroy Israel. National Infrastructure 
Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, made a similar warning in April 2008 when 
he stated that “An Iranian attack will lead to a harsh retaliation by Israel, 
which will lead to the destruction of the Iranian nation.”47 Following these 
comments, Iran’s deputy army chief, Gen. Muhammed Reza Ashitiani 
stated that: “Should Israel take any action against Iran, we will eliminate 
Israel from the scene of the universe.”48 
At the risk of stating the blindingly obvious, the rhetoric of war can 
lead to war. In many respects, it is surprising that no attack has yet 
occurred given the incendiary rhetoric coming out of Tehran. While Iran’s 
rhetoric may be intended to strengthen deterrence it also has the affect of 
hardening political calculations in Tel Aviv and Washington that there is no 
solution to the confrontation short of war. The 1967 war, for example, 
illustrates the limit of states’ patience in considering the use of force. In 
1967, the international community exhibited indifference to the scale of the 
threat faced by Israel.49 The best chance to avert war in 1967 was clearly 
firm and immediate American engagement, which failed to materialize. 
                                                 
47“Israeli Cabinet Minister Warns Iran Will be Destroyed if It Attacks Israel, Wire 
Service Reports, April 7, 2008. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/04/07/africa/ME-GEN-Israel-Iran.php. 
48 As quoted in Herb Keinon, “Iran Threatens to Eliminate Israel”, Jerusalem Post, April 15, 
2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1208246573612. 
49 See for example Benjamin Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers. The 
Sources of Regional War and Peace, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005, p. 233 ; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “The Arab-Israeli War of 1967”, in 
Alexander George (ed.), Avoiding War. Problems of Crisis Management, Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1991, pp. 304-319. 
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America’s commitment to Israel has not wavered since, perhaps because 
the lesson learned came at such a high price, and with such perilous risks. 
Escalation and the “Window of Opportunity” 
As suggested by Schelling, asymmetries in actor interests can complicate 
the functioning of the bargaining framework for actor participants. As 
outlined above, the interests and objectives of the participants differ in ways 
that potentially undermine predictable interactions of the framework 
participants. Also surrounding these asymmetries in interests are the 
circumstances of the present, in which there is a growing perception that 
the “window of opportunity” for preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear 
weapon may be closing.50 This perception creates conditions under which 
nuclear status quo powers such as the Israel or the United States may 
contemplate a preventive military strike. The likelihood of such a first strike 
attack in these circumstances is inversely related to calculations over the 
size of the window of opportunity.51 As long as Iran is believed to be years 
away from achieving operational capability, the prospect of an attack 
remains low. The more advanced Iran’s capabilities become, the higher the 
prospect of an attack. The inverse relationship is reflected in figure one 
below. 
Figure 1:  
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The most likely escalation trigger in the framework is a preventative 
conventional attack by the United States and/or Israel on Iran’s nuclear 
infrastructure if either or both actors become convinced that Iran was on the 
verge of operationalizing a weapon. Estimates vary on when this may 
                                                 
50 Press reports indicate that Iran may already possess enough enriched uranium 
for a nuclear device. William Broad and David Sanger, “Iran Said to Have Nuclear 
Fuel for One Weapon”, New York Times, November 19, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html?th&emc=th. 
51 This section draws upon treatment of this concept in Janice Gross Stein, 
“Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Reconsidered”, World 
Politics, vol. 29, No. 13, April 1987, pp. 326-352; also see Paul Huth and Bruce 
Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900-1980”, World Politics, 
vol 36, No. 4, July 1984, pp. 496-526. 
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occur. The United States Director of National Intelligence, J. Michael 
McConnell, testified in February 2008 that Iran could compile sufficient 
quantities of highly enriched uranium to build a nuclear device by 2010-
2015 – with 2009 representing the earliest date Iran could achieve this 
goal.52 Israel shares the basic outlines of the U.S. assessment, but takes a 
more alarmist view. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz stated in 
August 2008 that “Our estimation is that already by [2009] Iran will reach 
enrichment capability and as soon as 2010 will have option to reach 
[uranium production] at military levels.”53 Israeli plans for a preventative 
strike on Iranian nuclear sites appear periodically in the press,54 and Israel 
has undertaken a series of military exercises intended to demonstrate its 
military capabilities to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2008, 
Israel mounted an exercise using 100 F-15 and F-16 aircraft traveling over 
900 miles with aerial refueling tankers and pilot recovery operations that 
was widely seen as a rehearsal for such an attack.55 The United States 
reportedly told Israel in the summer of 2008 that it would not actively 
support a preventative attack.56 Despite the absence of a “green light” for 
the attack, the United States nonetheless agreed in September 2008 to 
provide $77 million for 1,000 GBU-39 bunker busting smart bombs that can 
reportedly penetrate up to six feet of reinforced concrete. The sale bolsters 
Israel’s ability to threaten Iran’s nuclear sites, IRGC and Hezbollah 
underground bunkers.57 
There is little doubt that Iran possesses the technical and industrial 
capacities to build a bomb. It has spent the last 20 years constructing a 
physical, technical, and human infrastructure to support the effort that is 
spread throughout the country. The extent of Iran’s military-related 
                                                 
52 Testimony of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat 
Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee”, 
February 27, 2008,  
http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/February/McConnell 02-27-08.pdf. 
53 As quoted in “Israel Warns of Iranian Nuclear Aims”, BBC Online, August 2, 2008; 
accessed online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7538524.stm. As for other 
estimates, please refer to  
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_analysis_Nov-IAEA-Report.pdf. 
54 Ralf Beste, Cordula Meyer and Christoph Schult, “Israeli Ministers Mull Plans for 
Military Strike Against Iran”, Spiegel Online International; June 16, 2008, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,559925,00.html. 
55 Details as reported in Donald Macintyre, “Israel’s Dry Run Attack on Iran with 
100 Jet Fighters”, The Independent, June 21, 2008, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israels-dry-run-attack-on-
iran-with-100-jet-fighters-851614.html. 
56 Jonathan Steele, “Israel Asked for Green Light to Bomb Iran Nuclear Sites”, 
Guardian.co.uk, September 25, 2008,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/25/iran.israelandthepalestinians1. 
57 “US Plans to Sell Israel 1,000 Bunker Busting Bombs”, AFP, September 15, 
2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/15/us-plans-to-sell-israel-1_n_126652.html. 
Also see David E. Sanger, “U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear 
Site”, New York Times, January 11, 2009. Sanger reported that the U.S. 
Administration/G.W. Bush didn’t accept to transfer to Israel the appropriate 
ordnance to strike Natanz underground facilities and also rejected the Israeli 
request to fly over Iraq.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?_r=2&hp  
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infrastructure remains unclear, and Iran continues to stonewall the IAEA’s 
repeated requests for information about suspected military-related 
activities. Iran is building a heavy water research reactor at Arak – useful 
primarily for developing a capacity to produce weapons grade plutonium. It 
is installing uranium gas centrifuges at Natanz – an underground, bunkered 
site sized to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. Widely available evidence 
suggests that Iran is either working on or has completed work on a series of 
second generation centrifuge designs. One of these, the IR-2, is a variant 
on the P-2 centrifuge design provided to Tehran by Pakistani scientist A. Q. 
Khan in the mid 1990s.58 The IR-2 gives Iran the capacity to enrich uranium 
at more than twice the speed of the P-1 centrifuge. There are also reports 
that Iran is developing a larger capacity IR-3 centrifuge, also a modification 
to Khan’s P-1.59 Iran is estimated to have at least 3,000 operational P-1s at 
Natanz. Iran’s statements describing its intent and its nuclear capacity only 
confirm the worst fears of many observers. In July 2008, Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad boasted that Iran was employing up to 6,000 centrifuges at 
Natanz – doubling estimates of the number of operational centrifuges.60 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheikh Attar later lowered these 
claims in to 4,000 in comments to the press made in August 2008.61 The 
uranium enrichment site at Natanz is only one critical element in a 
redundant infrastructure that is widely spread throughout the country – see 
Figure 2, page 30. 
Throughout 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
grappled with evidence suggesting that Iran may have or may be 
attempting to design a nuclear weapon. Data presented to diplomats in 
February 2008 by IAEA inspector Olli Heinonen suggested that Iran has 
been working on exploding detonators for an implosion-type nuclear device. 
More recent reports suggest that a Russian scientist assisted Iran in 
conducting the detonator experiments.62 It its September 2008 report to the 
United Nations Security Council, the IAEA noted that Iran had not 
satisfactorily responded requests for clarification about the “…green salt 
project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry project.”63 Details of 
                                                 
58 David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, “Iran Installing More Advanced Centrifuges 
at Natanz Pilot Enrichment Plant: Fact Sheet on the P-2/IR-2 Centrifuge”, The 
Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, DC, February 7, 2008, 
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_P2_7Feb2008.pdf.  
59 David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, “May 26, 2008 IAEA 
Safeguards Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Improving and Cooperation 
Lacking on Weapons Issues”, Rev. 2, The Institute for Science and International 
Security, Washington, DC, May 29, 2008,  
http://www.isis-nline.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf. 
60 Jon Leyne, “Iran Announces Nuclear Expansion”, BBC News Online, July 26 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7526894.stm. 
61 “Iran Claims to Have 4,000 Centrifuges”, Voice of America News, August 29, 2008, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-08/2008-08-29-voa15.cfm?CFID=53845365&CFTOKEN=93090930. 
62 Elaine Sciolino, “Nuclear Aid by Russian to Iranians Suspected”, New York Times, October 
10, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/world/10nuke.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; 
also see William Broad and David Sanger, “Meeting on Arms Data Reignites Iran Debate”, New 
York Time, March 3, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/middleeast/03nuke.html?pagewanted=all  
63Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of 
Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the 
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these and other weapons-related projects were revealed on the hard drive 
of a laptop computer stolen by an Iranian citizen in 2004 and delivered to 
Western intelligences services.64 The Iranians claim that much of the IAEA 
data are fabricated and they have provided unsatisfactory responses to the 
IAEA requests for clarifications on activities that many believe could only be 
related to a bomb program that clearly lies outside allowable activities for 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signatories.65 
Figure 2:  
Iran Nuclear Sites (Source: NTI66) 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, September 15. 2008; 
pp. 3-4. 
64 Dana Linzer, “Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran”, 
Washington Post, February 8, 2006, A1. 
65 An authoritative overview of Iran’s nuclear program is Paul Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear 
Program: Status”, Congressional Research Service, June 23, 2008, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34544.pdf; also see brief compiled by Anthony 
Cordesman, “The U.S., Israel, The Arab States, and a Nuclear Iran”, September 
23, 2008, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington , DC, 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear.pdf. 
66 Posted online at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles_pdfs/Iran/iran_nuclear_sites.pdf  
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The near-term scenarios outlined in the third section (which are not 
mutually exclusive) all reflect a cost-benefit calculus for attack so long as 
actors perceive that the window of opportunity for a successful attack 
remains open. Some argue that the window is already closed due to the 
military difficulties of destroying Iran’s program.67 Difficulties faced by 
military planners include: Iran’s sources of centrifuge equipment and 
technology are unknown; its production facilities for centrifuges are widely 
dispersed; the infrastructure for its clandestine military program are 
unknown; and it is unknown where Iran stores its uranium hexafluoride – a 
stockpile estimated to total 300 tons.68 These are just a few of the 
uncertainties that must be addressed by target planners. As the window 
begins to close, the actor contemplating the attack realizes that the costs of 
attack will dramatically increase – particularly if the adversary reaches 
operational capability and the attacker is faced with a nuclear armed 
adversary. The motivation for attack is thus highest when the attacker 
perceives that the window of opportunity is closing. The actor seeking to 
forestall the attack will take two actions: (1) try and demonstrate military 
strength to delay the attack and, in parallel, (2) use deception about the 
status of his actual capabilities to keep the attacker uncertain as to how 
wide the window remains open for the attack. 
US calculations in this framework are complicated. Preventative 
military action against Iran based on alleged Iranian nuclear capabilities will 
be politically difficult to justify due to the recent experiences of Iraq in which 
the counterproliferation rationale for the war was largely manufactured 
before the war. In other words, the political costs of mounting a 
preventative attack before Iran has achieved a nuclear capability may be 
unacceptably high for the United States – to say nothing of the destabilizing 
consequences throughout the region. These cost/benefit calculations do 
not improve for either the United States or Israel once Iran gets nuclear: 
what could be gained in terms of legitimacy would be more than 
compensated by the perils involved in trying to disarm a nuclear adversary. 
Throughout these interactions Iran would logically maintain a strong interest 
in a pre-emptive attack if it believed an attack by Israel and the United 
States was imminent. Iranian President Ahmadinejad referenced this 
prospect on September 21, 2008 in remarks at a military parade in Iran 
when he stated: “If anyone allows themselves to invade Iranian territory and 
its legal interests... our armed forces will break their hands before they pull 
the trigger.”69 Iran’s interest in a forestalling preventative attack is a 
profound source of crisis instability. 
An added pressure to strike before the window of opportunity closes 
is the attacker’s long-term assessments about its ability to construct a 
                                                 
67 See David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, “Can Military Strikes 
Destroy Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program? Probably Not”, ISIS Report, Institute for 
Science and International Security, Washington, DC, August 7, 2008, 
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/Centrifuge_Manufacturing_7August2008.pdf. 
68 Ibid. 
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stable deterrent with the adversary seeking the nuclear capability. In the 
case of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the Soviet detonation of its nuclear 
device in August 1949 presented the United States with a fait accompli that 
could not be reversed.70 However, the Soviets could not reach U.S. territory 
for quite some time, and even after that the U.S. enjoyed a very significant 
superority in numbers; because of these asymmetries, there were serious 
debates about a preventive attack in the United States up to the 
Eisenhower Administration. But over the next 20 years, the superpowers 
gradually constructed a stable deterrent relationship, in part because each 
party had little choice – in spite of their ideological differences. In the case 
of Israel and Iran, it is not clear that either country shares an interest in a 
stable deterrent relationship. Israel remains opposed to any existential 
threats to the nation and shows little understandable interest in relying on 
deterrence to manage the threat from an adversary that has repeatedly 
indicated its unmitigated hostility to the Jewish state. Iran casts its hostility 
to Israel in the language of ethno-national and religious conflict and also 
shows little interest in engaging in negotiations or other measures to reduce 
tensions. While Iran did make several moves in an effort to signal its 
willingness to negotiate circa 2002, these fell on deaf ears within the Bush 
Administration. Ultimately, if Israel and/or the United States don’t believe 
they can build a deterrent relationship with Tehran under any 
circumstances, this is a further incentive to strike before Iran explodes a 
device. 
The prospect of an attack by Israel and the United States (and 
conflict escalation) decreases after program maturation due to the potential 
costs to the actor contemplating the attack. In other words, Israel and/or the 
United States are less likely to start a war with a nuclear armed-Iran – an 
idea that has surely occurred to the religious hierarchy exercising political 
authority in Tehran. 
This analysis of the Middle East strategic framework suggests that 
structural uncertainties could, both in the short and long term, result in an 
escalation process culminating with the use of nuclear weapons. 
 
                                                 
70 A device based on a stolen design of the U.S. bomb dropped on Nagasaki 
provided by Klaus Fuchs and others. See the gripping tale of the Soviet espionage 
program in Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, New 
York, Touchstone, 1996. A different historical interpretation, arguing that while the 
Soviets were assisted by espionage, this was not the only reason for their 
thermonuclear capability, is presented by David Holloway in his book Stalin and the 
Bomb, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995.  
 
 
Nuclear Use in the Middle East ? 
he previous analysis of the regional bargaining framework suggests 
both near- and long-term scenarios of a breaking of the “taboo” on the 
use of nuclear weapons. The near-term scenarios are predicated on the 
assumption that nuclear use can occur either directly against Iran or as a 
result of an escalation during a conflict with Iran. Longer-term scenarios are 
less strictly focused on the Iranian case, but also flow from the same 
unstable regional dynamics.  
Near-Term Nuclear Use Scenarios  
In describing near-term regional scenarios that could lead to the use of 
nuclear weapons, three parties present themselves as principal candidates 
to cross the nuclear threshold: Israel, Iran and the United States. While 
another regional state or non-state actor may possess nuclear weapons, 
publicly available information suggests that Israel is the only nuclear 
weapons state in the region. It is also possible that Iran has already 
crossed the nuclear threshold and is already a nuclear weapons state. A 
massive intelligence failure allowing Iran to quietly become a nuclear power 
must be factored into potential near-term scenarios for nuclear use. 
Various Israeli officials have openly stated that Israel will attack Iran 
before it achieves a nuclear capability. In June 2008, then Israeli Deputy 
Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz stated: “If Iran continues its program to develop 
nuclear weapons, we will attack it. The window of opportunity has closed. 
The sanctions are not effective. There will be no alternative but to attack 
Iran in order to stop the Iranian nuclear program.”71 For its part, the United 
States has explicitly extended its nuclear umbrella over Israel and a variety 
of Gulf States that host American military forces. In extending a nuclear 
umbrella over Israel,72 senior American officials have repeatedly made 
veiled references of their commitment to use all means at their disposal to 
defend Israel up to and including nuclear weapons. Vice President Dick 
Cheney offered the following representative formulation of the American 
commitment to Israeli security in 2008 when he stated: “America’s 
commitment to Israel’s security is enduring and unshakable,” he said, “as is 
our commitment to Israel’s right to defend itself always against terrorism, 
rocket attacks and other threats from forces dedicated to Israel’s 
                                                 
71 “Israeli Politician Threatens Iran with Attacks Over Nukes”, CNN, June 6, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/06/israel.iran/index.html. 
72 Strongly implied in the Nuclear Posture Review, January 8, 2002, Department of 
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destruction.”73 President Bush specifically stated in February 2006 that the 
United States would defend Israel militarily in the event of an attack by 
Iran.74 In October 2007, President Bush stated that a nuclear-armed Iran 
might lead to World War III.75 In remarks that received no disavowals from 
government sources, then Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
stated in April 2008 that the United States would “obliterate” Iran if it ever 
attacked Israel with nuclear weapons.76 While these commitments don’t 
contradict the American policy of not supporting an Israeli preemptive strike 
on Iran’s nuclear infrastructures, borne out in former President Bush’s 
refusal to greenlight an Israeli request for overflight rights to cross Iraqi 
airspace, they do strongly suggest that the United States would retaliate 
forcefully in the event the Iranians attacked Israel with nuclear weapons, 
since it would be Iran committing nuclear first use and breaking the long 
taboo in place since 1945. America’s disapproval of Israeli pre-emption 
may reflect a reduced national appetite for military action in general, and for 
unilateral strategic action. However, the intensity of U.S.-Israeli bilateral 
relations places the United States in an extremely awkward position: on the 
one hand, a cherished ally could openly be calling for the fulfillment of 
security commitments77 for its protection and security in response to an 
external threat; on the other hand, U.S. security commitment to its allies 
include deterrence and defense, but are widely regarded as excluding 
preventative actions.  
To summarize, systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining 
framework induce the prospect of strategic instability in which escalation 
could unfold in a number of scenarios leading to the use of nuclear 
weapons by either the United States, Israel, or Iran. For purposes of this 
paper, escalation means an expansion of the intensity and scope of the 
                                                 
73 “Cheney Affirms U.S. Commitment to Israeli Security”, Los Angeles Times, 
March 28, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/23/world/fg-cheney23. 
74 Glenn Kessler, “Bush Says U.S. Would Defend Israel if Necessary”, Washington 
Post, February 2, A18,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/01/AR2006020102134.html. 
75 Bush made his comments at a press conference on October 17, 2007 in which 
he said: “We got a leader in Iran who has announced that he wants to destroy 
Israel. So I've told people that if you're interested in avoiding World War III, it 
seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from [having] the 
knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.” Text posted on the MSNBC 
website, http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/10/18/417347.aspx. 
76 As quoted in “Clinton Warns Iran of US Nuclear Response”, MSNBC, April 21, 
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24246275. 
77 In addition to various executive-branch agreements that commit the United 
States to provide defense equipment to Israel, American political commitments to 
defend Israel have taken the form of repeated declarations by American presidents 
and senior officials. For example, then President Bush stated in May 2006: “I told 
the prime minister [Olmert] what I've stated publicly before: Israel is a close friend 
and ally of the United States. And in the event of any attack on Israel, the United 
States will come to Israel's aid.” Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reiterated the 
Obama Administration’s commitment to the defense of Israel during her March 
2009 visit, when she stated: “It is important that the United States always 
underscores our unshakeable, durable and fundamental support for the state of 
Israel.” 
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conflict.78 The common denominator for the proposed scenarios is that 
nuclear use occurs in the context of conflict escalation – a conflict that 
could be initiated by a variety of different parties and in a variety of different 
circumstances.79 It is extremely unlikely that either the United States or 
Israel would initiate the use of nuclear weapons as part of a pre-emptive 
attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.80 However, there are escalation scenarios 
involving state and non-state actors in the coercive bargaining framework 
that could conceivably lead to nuclear weapons use by Israel and/or the 
United States. 
Iran’s response to what would initially start as a sustained stand-off 
bombardment (Desert Fox Heavy) could take a number of different forms 
that might lead to escalation by the United States and Israel, surrounding 
states, and non-state actors. Once the strikes commenced, it is difficult to 
imagine Iran remaining in a Saddam-like quiescent mode and hunkering 
down to wait out the attacks. Iranian leaders have unequivocally stated that 
any attack on its nuclear sites will result in a wider war81 – a war that could 
involve regional states on both sides as well as non-state actors like Hamas 
and Hezbollah. While a wider regional war need not lead to escalation and 
nuclear use by either Israel or the United States, wartime circumstances 
and domestic political pressures could combine to shape decision-making 
in ways that present nuclear use as an option to achieve military and 
political objectives. For both the United States and Israel, Iranian or proxy 
use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons represent the most 
serious potential escalation triggers. For Israel, a sustained conventional 
bombardment of its urban centers by Hezbollah rockets in Southern 
Lebanon could also trigger an escalation spiral. Assessing relative 
probability of these scenarios is very difficult and beyond the scope of this 
article. Some scenarios for Iranian responses that could lead to escalation 
by the United States and Israel are: 
                                                 
78 Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, Force Order and Justice, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1967, p. 188. 
79 For background on this idea, see Daniel S. Geller, “Nuclear Weapons, 
Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 34, No. 
2, June 1990, pp. 291-310; Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War 
and Nuclear Risks, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. 
80 Israel would likely be restrained from nuclear use, knowing full well that much of 
its own populace, in addition to the world community, would express revulsion from 
its nuclear use, and knowing that its allies would likely oppose such action. Even its 
limited and relatively precise application of force in Gaza resulted in a rapid erosion 
of international support, especially from Europe, and a notable lack of enthusiasm 
from the Bush White House, even after several years of rocket attacks against 
southern Israel.  
81 Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stated in February 2007 that any 
U.S. attack on Iran would result in “…comprehensive reaction to the invaders and 
their interests all over the world.” In July 2008, the head of the Iran Revolutionary 
Guard Corps, Gen. Mohammed Ali Jafari Ali Shirazi stated that any attack on Iran’s 
nuclear sites would be the start of a general war. See “Iranian Military Warns U.S., 
Israel Against Attack”, Associated Press, July 7, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/08/iran.military.ap/index.html. 
 
J. Russell / Strategic Stability Reconsidered 
 - 36 -
• Terrorist-type asymmetric attacks on either the U.S. or Israeli 
homelands by Iran or its proxies using either conventional or 
unconventional (chemical, biological, or radiological) weapons. 
Escalation is more likely in response to the use of unconventional 
weapons in populated urban centers. The potential for use of 
nuclear retaliation against terrorist type attacks is problematic, 
unless of course the sponsoring country takes official responsibility 
for them, which seems highly unlikely.  
 
• Asymmetric attacks by Iran or its proxies using unconventional 
weapons against U.S. military facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States 
(Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar); 
 
• Long-range missile strikes by Iran attacking Israel and/or U.S. 
facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States: 
 
• Conventional missile strikes in and around the Israeli reactor at 
Dimona 
 
• Airbursts of chemical or radiological agents in Israeli urban areas;  
 
• Missile strikes using non-conventional weapons against US Gulf 
facilities such as Al Udeid in Qatar, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, 
and the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. Under all 
scenarios involving chemical/biological attacks on its forces, the 
United States has historically retained the right to respond with all 
means at its disposal even if the attacks come from a non-nuclear 
weapons state.82 
 
• The involvement of non-state actors as part of ongoing hostilities 
between Iran, the United States, and Israel in which Hezbollah 
and/or Hamas became engaged presents an added dimension for 
conflict escalation. While tactically allied with Iran and each other, 
these groups have divergent interests and objectives that could 
affect their involvement (or non-involvement in a wider regional war) 
– particularly in ways that might prompt escalation by Israel and the 
United States. Hezbollah is widely believed to have stored 
thousands of short range Iranian-supplied rockets in southern 
Lebanon. Attacking Israel in successive fusillades of missiles over 
time could lead to domestic political demands on the Israeli military 
to immediately stop these external attacks – a mission that might 
require a wide area-denial capability provided by nuclear weapons 
and their associated PSI overpressures, particularly if its 
conventional ground operations in Gaza prove in the mid- to long-
terms as indecisive or strategic ambiguous as its 2006 operations in 
Lebanon. 
 
• Another source of uncertainty is the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) – referred to here as “quasi-state” actor. The IRGC 
                                                 
82 As discussed in James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “Negative Assurances 
and the Nuclear Posture Review,” op. cit.  
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manages the regime’s nuclear, chemical and missile programs and 
is responsible for “extraterritorial” operations outside Iran. The IRGC 
is considered as instrument of the state and reports directly to 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. So far, the IRGC has 
apparently refrained from providing unconventional weapons to its 
surrogates. The IRGC also, however arms and funds various Shiite 
paramilitary groups in Iraq and Lebanon that have interests and 
objectives that may or may not directly reflect those of the Iranian 
supreme leader. Actions of these groups in a wartime environment 
are another source of strategic uncertainty that could shape crisis 
decision-making in unhelpful ways. 
 
• The most likely regional state to be drawn into a conflict on Iran’s 
side in a wider regional war is Syria, which is widely reported to 
have well developed missile and chemical warfare programs. Direct 
Syrian military involvement in an Israeli-U.S./Iranian war taking the 
form of missile strikes or chemical attacks on Israel could serve as 
another escalation trigger in a nuclear-use scenario, in particular if 
chemical or bio-chem weapons are used by the Syrians, technically 
crossing the WMD-chasm and triggering a retaliatory strike using 
any category of WMD including nuclear weapons. 
 
• The last – and perhaps most disturbing – of these near-term 
scenarios is the possible use by Iran of nuclear weapons in the 
event of conventional strikes by the United States and Israel. This 
scenario is built on the assumption of a U.S. and/or Israeli 
intelligence failure to detect Iranian possession of a nuclear device 
that had either been covertly built or acquired from another source. 
It is possible to foresee an Iranian “demonstration” use of a nuclear 
weapon in such a scenario in an attempt to stop an Israeli/U.S. 
conventional bombardment. A darker scenario would be a direct 
nuclear attack by Iran on Israel, also precipitated by conventional 
strikes, inducing a “use them or lose them” response. In turn, such a 
nuclear strike would almost certainly prompt an Israeli and U.S. 
massive response – a potential “Armageddon” scenario. 
 
Longer-Term Use Scenarios 
The preceding scenarios are all based on the premise that near-term 
systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework surrounding 
Iran’s nuclear program could lead to war and conflict escalation. It is also 
the case that use of nuclear weapons could of course occur much further in 
the future. Like the short-term scenarios, the main long-term source of 
strategic instability are Iran’s nuclear program and Israel’s implacable 
commitment to maintaining its nuclear monopoly. The region’s entire 
nuclear posture currently is in a state of uncertainty. During 2006 and 2007, 
13 states in the Middle East and North Africa region unexpectedly 
announced plans to pursue nuclear energy.83 Some of these plans 
admittedly represent a minimal proliferation threat. Various regional states 
such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have all 
indicated that their programs would not include an indigenous uranium 
                                                 
83 As noted in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East, London, IISS, 2008, p. 7. 
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enrichment capability – a critical building block for a weapons program. 
Despite assurances by Middle Eastern regional leaders that their programs 
will represent “models” for other states seeking peaceful nuclear 
programs,84 however, many fear that these programs create opportunities 
for clandestine nuclear programs and a new and destabilizing nuclear arms 
race.85 This situation creates prospects for a series of long-term scenarios 
as outlined below: 
• The chances of clandestine program development increases as 
more states enter the nuclear business. The motivations for 
clandestine development increase in the region if Iran successfully 
crosses the nuclear threshold – a situation greatly feared by the 
Sunni-led states in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The 
emergence of clandestine programs in the region creates incentives 
for preventative attack by a number of actors, some of whom may 
be nuclear armed. As with the case in the near-term scenarios, any 
wartime scenarios create the prospect of escalation and nuclear 
use. 
 
• Regional powers might also, under extreme circumstances, be 
tempted to resort to nukes with the belief that it can successfully 
break the will of its opponent, much like the United States did 
against its Japanese opponent in 1945. 
 
• While it currently appears remote, regime(s) change that brings to 
power millennial extremists constitute another prospect that might 
factor into long-term use scenarios. Extremist religious and/or 
ideologically motivated leadership may view nuclear weapons as a 
useful tool in pursuit of their objectives. 
 
• The prospect of use by a clandestinely-armed state cannot be 
dismissed over the longer-term either as a calculated attack on an 
unsuspecting adversary or in the context of a war for national 
survival. 
 
• A nuclear “bolt-from-the-blue” attack by violent non-state actors or a 
resort to nuclear use in the belief that it can successfully break the 
will of its opponent, much like the United States did against its 
Japanese opponent in 1945, is possible both in short- and long-term 
scenarios, but is deemed a remote possibility in this analysis. In the 
Middle East, most terrorist groups fall into the category of “religious 
nationalists” that seek localized political objectives. It is difficult to 
see how using a nuclear weapon advances the cause of groups like 
Hamas or Hezbollah. On the other hand, millennial extremist groups 
like Al Qaeda might be more attracted to the possibility of using a 
nuclear weapon should they come into possession of one. Terrorist 
                                                 
84 As asserted by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal in Mariam Hakeem, 
“GCC’s Nuclear Programme Will be a Role Model”, Gulf News, January 14, 2007, 
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/01/14/10096775.html. 
85 Joby Warrick, “Spread of Nuclear Capability is Feared”, Washington Post, May 
12, 2008, p. A1. 
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groups would face significant technical and political obstacles in 
acquiring a nuclear weapon from a state, since the supplier would 
be held responsible by the attacked actor. Another limiting factor is 
constituency constraints. Even millennial extremist groups serve 
political constituencies.86 In the case of Al Qaeda, and though it 
could try to hide behind a veil of deniability, it must conduct 
operations in pursuit of its broader political objective of unifying a 
purified ummah and cannot afford to use tactics that may 
compromise its ability to achieve this objective by giving rise to 
global revulsion and also potentially killing large numbers of 
Muslims. 
 
                                                 
86 See William Browne III, “Constituency Constraints on Violence: al Qaeda and 
WMD”, in Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks, 
and International Security, James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz (eds.), New York, 





trategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) 
asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce 
unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors 
that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; 
(3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent 
relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) 
perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity 
for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the 
prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve 
unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or 
the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust 
and cooperation among framework participants.  
These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework 
all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on 
purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime 
circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine 
scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the 
regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons.  
It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow 
magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an 
unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact 
suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which 
escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once 
such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own 
and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. 
The international community must take this possibility seriously, and 
muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would 
be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial 
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